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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-ALIBI

INSTRUCTIONS

AND

DUE

PROCESS OF LAW

INTRODUCTION

There is a controversy among the United States courts of ap
peals as to whether the Due Process Clause l of the United States
Constitution requires a trial court to issue a jury instruction on the
burden of proof for an alibi defense. 2 An "alibi instruction" in
forms the jury that the prosecution has the burden of disproving the
defendant's alibi beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant
does not have the burden of proving the alibi. 3
1. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[n]o per
son shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment protects individuals against the power of the
federal government. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights limits federal power but does not limit state
power). The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any per
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" and protects individuals
against the power of state governments. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Courts have generally interpreted the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four
teenth Amendments identically, so that procedural due process rights are entitled to the
same protection in federal and state criminal trials. See George Kannar, Comment, The
Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1349 (1990) ("Theories
concerning the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause ap
ply, of course, in almost identical fashion to the interpretation of the same language in
the Fifth Amendment."); Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the
Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 520
n.46 (1986) ("The Supreme Court has declared that the two clauses, although adopted
in different historical contexts, have the same meaning." (citations omitted»; Michael
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaugh
ter-House Cases Re-examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 821 n.164 (1982) ("Since the lan
guage of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted from the Fifth
Amendment, the rules of documentary interpretation require that the Clauses have the
same meaning." (citation omitted».
2. An alibi is "[a] defense that places the defendant at the relevant time of crime
in a different place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render it
impossible for him to be the guilty party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 71 (6th ed. 1990)
(citation omitted).
3. See Myron P. Watson, Project, Necessity of Alibi Instructions: The Court's Un
swaying Resolve to Protect a Defendant'S Right to an Alibi Instruction, 33 How. L.J. 437,
437 (1991). See infra note 52 and accompanying text for an example of an alibi
instruction.
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In United States v. Hicks,4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that a trial court's failure to give the jury
an alibi instruction, when the alibi is supported by any evidence,
violates the defendant's due process right under the Constitution
and that any such violation should be assessed to determine
whether it is harmless. 5 At the other extreme, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v. Simon,6
held that a trial court is not constitutionally required to give an alibi
instruction and that a federal court of appeals has the discretion to
make a "supervisory" rule to decide the issue for itself.? The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Duckett v.
Godinez,8 took an intermediate position by holding that the deter
mination of whether due process is violated by a court's refusal to
give an alibi instruction depends on the totality of instructions given
to the jury as well as the evidence offered at triaL9 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Presley v. Rees,lO expressed a view
that is consistent with Duckett on whether an alibi instruction is
constitutionally required. l1 Neither the United States Supreme
Court nor the courts of appeals for the remaining circuits have con
sidered this issue.
This Note addresses the issue of whether the Due Process
Clause imposes an unconditional requirement on a trial court to
give the jury an alibi instruction or whether it imposes a conditional
requirement, based on the results of a test, to give the instruction.
The former approach, adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Hicks, will
be referred to in this Note as a "per se error" theory. Under this
approach, failure to give the instruction is a per se constitutional
error. The latter approach, exemplified by the Ninth Circuit in
Duckett and the Sixth Circuit in Presley, will be referred to as a
"conditional error" theory. Under the "conditional error" ap
proach, whether a trial court committed a constitutional error by
4. 748 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1984).
5. See id. at 857-58. See infra note 17 for an explanation of the "harmless error"
doctrine.
6. 995 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1993).
7. See id. at 1244-45. However, the Simon opinion does not define the term
"supervisory."
8. 67 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995).
9. See id. at 745.
10. No. 85-5569, 1985 WL 14152 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 1985).
11. See id. at *1-2 (holding that the defendant's due process rights were not vio
lated in consideration of the overall instructions to the jury, physical evidence against
the defendant, victim's identification of the defendant, and defendant's witnesses in
support of his alibi defense).
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failing to give the jury an alibi instruction depends on the outcome
of a test.12 This Note does not examine the "no error" theory of the
Third Circuit, since the Simon opinion does not provide any sup
port for this approach and does not address the contrary views of
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits that preceded it.
Part I of this Note provides an introduction to theory of de
fense 13 instructions and to the alibi instruction in particular. Part II
discusses the principal alibi instruction cases that frame the issue to
be resolved by this Note: whether the Due Process Clause imposes
an unconditional requirement on a trial court to give the jury an
alibi instruction or whether it imposes a conditional requirement,
based on the results of a test, to give the instruction.
Part III develops three arguments which support the "per se
error" theory. The first argument contends that a trial court's fail
ure to instruct the jury on the defendant's alibi unconstitutionally
shifts the burden of proof for the alibi to the defendant.14 The sec
ond argument analogizes failure to give an alibi instruction to fail
ure to give a reasonable doubt instruction, which is a due process
error.1 5 The third argument compares the failure to give an alibi
instruction with the giving of a Sandstrom burden-shifting instruc
tion, which violates due process.1 6 Additionally, this Part contends
that, under the "per se error" approach, the constitutional error of
not giving the jury an alibi instruction is subject to the harmless
error test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Chap
man v. CaliforniaY
Part IV develops support for the "conditional error" approach
by showing that alibi instructions are analogous to presumption of
12. See infra Part IV.C.2 for a discussion of why the appropriate test for the "con
ditional error" approach is a "totality of circumstances" test.
13. A theory of defense formulates the legal basis of a defense that a criminal
defendant presents at trial.
14. See infra Part IILA for the first argument in support of a "per se error"
theory.
15. See infra Part IILB for the second argument in support of a "per se error"
theory.
16. A Sandstrom instruction, which originated in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510 (1979), shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant on the element of intent.
See infra Part IILe for a discussion of the Sandstrom case and for the third argument in
support of a "per se error" theory.
17. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under the constitutional harmless error doctrine enunci
ated in Chapman, a defendant's conviction is reversed if after having determined that a
constitutional error occurred during the trial, the reviewing court concludes that the
error was not harmless. See id. at 22. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of why a
harmless error test is required under a "per se error" approach.
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innocence instructions and that presumption of innocence instruc
tions are conditionally required by due process on the basis of a
test. This Part also argues that, under the "conditional error" ap
proach, a harmless error inquiry is not required.
After weighing the "per se error" approach against the "condi
tional error" approach, in Part V, this Note concludes that a trial
court's failure to issue a requested alibi instruction, where there is
evidentiary support for the alibi, is a per se constitutional error sub
ject to harmless error review.
I.

BACKGROUND ON THEORY OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

This Part introduces constitutional rights relating to a criminal
defendant's theory of defense from the perspective of both the
United States Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals,
with particular emphasis on alibi defenses and instructions.
A.

Theory of Defense

A defense is a "set of identifiable conditions or circumstances
which may prevent a conviction for an offense."18 Defenses may be
divided into categories. One category is a "failure of proof" de
fense, which serves to negate an element of the alleged crime. 19 An
alibiZo is a failure of proof defense that negates the actus reus, or
conduct, element. 21
Since a criminal defendant has a fair trial right under the Due
Process Clause 22 to present a complete defense?3 an important is
sue is whether a trial court is required, under due process, to in
struct the jury on the defendant's theory of defense. Both the
United States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have
18. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 199, 203 (1982).
19. See id. at 204.
20. See supra note 2 for a definition of an alibi defense.
21. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 208.
A right to a fair trial in a federal court is protected under the Due Process
22.
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976).
A right to a fair trial in a state court is protected under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 790 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
23. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) ("Under the Due Pro
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with
prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We have long interpreted this standard of
fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.").
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considered whether a court is required to give the jury an instruc
tion on the defendant's theory of defense. In Mathews v. United
States,24 the Supreme Court stated that "[a]s a general proposition a
defendant is entitled to [a jury] instruction as to any recognized de
fense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury
to find in his favor."25 However, the Mathews court did not base
this rule on the United States Constitution. 26
Similarly, most federal courts of appeals consider a defendant
to be entitled to a jury instruction on any theory of defense having
evidentiary support, including the United States Courts of Appeals
for the First ,27 Second ,28 Third ,29 Fourth,30 Fifth ,31 Sixth,32 Sev
24. 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
25. Id. at 63 (citing Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896». In Mathews,
the district court convicted a federal employee for the federal crime of accepting a bribe
in return for granting governmental favors. See id. at 60-62. After the court of appeals
affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the district court denied
the defendant's request for an entrapment defense instruction on the erroneous
grounds that the entrapment defense is inconsistent with the defendant's denial of hav
ing committed the crime. See id. at 62. The Supreme Court held that a defendant who
denies commission of the charged crime is entitled to an entrapment instruction if there
is sufficient evidence to support a finding of entrapment by the jury. See id.
26. Mathews based the rule on Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896).
See Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63. Stevenson held that there was sufficient evidence to justify
instructions for both manslaughter and self-defense in spite of the inconsistency of these
two defenses. See Stevenson, 162 U.S. at 323. However, Stevenson was silent as to
whether its holding had a constitutional basis.
27. See United States v. McGill, 953 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1992) ('''It is hornbook
law that an accused is entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense so long as the
theory is a valid one and there is evidence in the record to support it.'" (quoting United
States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st Cir. 1988))). In McGill, the defendant was
convicted of willful federal income tax evasion and appealed on grounds that the dis
trict court failed to give the defendant's requested instruction that he could not "be held
criminally liable if in good faith he misunderstood the requirements of [the] law, or in
good faith believed that his income was not taxable." Id. at 12. The court of appeals
held that the district court adequately communicated the defendant's theory of defense
by giving instructions to the jury in words other than those requested by the defendant.
See id. at 12-13.
28. See United States v. Urlacher, 979 F.2d 935, 938 (2d Cir. 1992) ('''A criminal
defendant is entitled to have instructions presented related to any theory of defense for
which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible that
evidence may be.'" (quoting United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466, 474 n.8 (2d Cir.
1956))).
29. See United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1991) (" 'Clearly a
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of defense whenever some evi
dence supports that theory ....'" (quoting United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1013
(3d CiT. 1986))).
30. See Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1354 (4th CiT. 1995) ("[I]f a defendant
has a particular theory of defense, he is constitutionally entitled to an instruction on
that theory if the evidence supports it.").
31. See United States v. Johnson, 872 F.2d 612, 622 (5th Cir. 1989) ("When a
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enth,33 Eighth,34 Ninth,35 and Tenth36 Circuits, where the eviden
tiary-support requirement varies among the federal circuits. The
Eleventh Circuit has the additional requirement that "a refusal to
give a requested [theory of defense] instruction is an abuse of dis
cretion if ... the failure to give the instruction seriously impair[s]
the defendant's ability to present an effective defense."37 Notwith
standing the varying standards of required evidentiary support for
an alibi, the otherwise consistent opinions of the federal courts of
appeals suggest that failure to give the jury an instruction on the
defendant's theory of defense may be a constitutional due process
error. In particular, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, which are cir
cuits that disagree on the focal issue of this Note (whether an alibi
instruction is constitutionally required), both agree that a theory of
defense instruction is constitutionally required. 38
defendant properly requests an instruction on a theory of defense that is supported by
some evidence, it is reversible error not to adequately present the theory.").
32. See United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1132 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[S]o long
as there is even weak supporting evidence, '[a] trial court commits reversible error in a
criminal case when it fails to give an adequate presentation of a theory of defense.'"
(quoting United States v. Plummer, 789 F.2d 435, 438 (6th Cir. 1986))).
33. See United States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The defend
ants are entitled to a theory of defense instruction if (1) they propose a correct state
ment of the law; (2) their theory is supported by the evidence; (3) their theory is not
part of the charge; and (4) the failure to include an instruction on defendants' theory of
defense would deny defendants a fair trial." (citing United States v. Elder, 16 F.3d 733,
738 (7th Cir. 1994))).
34. See United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (8th Cir. 1987) ("A crimi
nal defendant is entitled to a 'theory of defense' instruction if the instruction correctly
states the law and the facts in evidence support the theory." (citing United States v.
Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195-96 (8th Cir. 1983))).
35. See United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 1996) ("A defend
ant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case 'provided that it is supported
by law and has some foundation in the evidence.'" (quoting United States v. Dees, 34
F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1994))); see also United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d
1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The right to have the jury instructed as to the defendant's
theory of the case is one of those rights 'so basic to a fair trial' that failure to instruct
where there is evidence to support the instruction can never be considered harmless
error.").
36. See United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 1987) ("A defendant is
entitled to jury instructions on any theory of defense finding support in the evidence
and the law, and the failure to so instruct is reversible error." (citing United States v.
Lofton, 776 F.2d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 1985))).
37. United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States
v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (11th Cir. 1994)).
38. The Fourth Circuit stated that "a defendant ... is constitutionally entitled to
[a defense] instruction ... if the evidence supports it." Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d
1350, 1354 (4th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he right to have the jury
instructed as to the defendant's theory of the case is ... basic to a fair trial." Escobar de
Bright, 742 F.2d at 1201. A right to a fair trial is a due process right. See supra note 22.
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The Mathews rule and the positions of the federal courts of
appeals suggest that a defendant has a right to a theory of defense
instruction. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has not
declared this right to be based on the United States Constitution.
Therefore, if a defendant has a constitutional right to an alibi in
struction, the right is not derived from a more general constitu
tional right to a theory of defense instruction, but must be based on
the unique characteristics of the alibi defense itself.
B.

Alibi Defense

An alibi3 9 places a defendant at a location that negates the pos
sibility that the defendant committed the crime. 40
It is said that an alibi, if established, constitutes a complete, legiti

mate, and effective defense, and that it precludes the possibility
of guilt. It is also said that an alibi is the most perfect, physically
conclusive evidence of the accused's innocence, and, since it is a
complete defense by itself, that it is neither helped nor hurt by
other defenses. 41

An alibi defense differs fundamentally from an affirmative defense.
An affirmative defense requires proof of facts that are extrinsic to
the elements of the charged offense. 42 Thus, an affirmative defense,
if successful, releases the defendant from criminal liability even if
the prosecution proves all of the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. 43 Entrapment is an example of an affirmative
defense. 44 With entrapment, the defendant is entitled to acquittal,
even if the prosecution proves all the elements of the crime, if it is
proved that the government induced the defendant to commit the
crime and the defendant is not predisposed to commit the type of
39. See United States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1993), for the categoriza
tion of alibi as a defense.
40. See United States v. Brooks, 25 M.J. 175, 178 (eM.A. 1987) ("Alibi-which
in Latin means 'elsewhere'-is a term applied to an accused's claim that he was at
another place when the crime was committed."). See supra note 2 for an equivalent
definition of alibi.
41. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 192 (1981).
42. An affirmative defense "involves ... excuse or justification peculiarly within
the knowledge of the defendant on which he can fairly be required to adduce support
ing evidence." MODEL PENAL CODE §1.12(3)(c) (1962). "Excuses, like justifications,
are usually general defenses applicable to all offenses even though the elements of the
offense are satisfied." Robinson, supra note 18, at 221.
43. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause as requiring the
prosecution to prove each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
44. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 59 (1988).

350

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:343

crime charged.45 Other examples of affirmative defenses are self
defense 46 and necessity.47
An alibi defense, on the other hand, represents a negation of
an element of the crime itself, namely the actus reus, or conduct,
element. 48 Since "the prosecution must prove the elements of the
offense, it follows that the prosecution must disprove defenses that
assert the non-existence of those elements."49
An alibi instruction specifically informs the jury that the de
fendant is not required to prove an alibi defense and the prosecu
tion is required to negate the alibi beyond a reasonable doubt. 50
Federal courts of appeals have pattern jury instructions51 which the
courts may use. For example,
[t]he defendant has introduced evidence to show that he was not
present at the time and place of the commission of the offense
charged in the indictment. The government has the burden of
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's presence
at that time and place.
If, after a consideration of all the evidence, you have a rea
sonable doubt that the defendant was present at the time the
45. See id. at 63.
46. A person has the right to kill in self-defense in the face of an imminent, un
lawful threat of deadly force directed against the defender who did not provoke the
conflict. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1224-26, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(holding that self-defense was not available to the defendant who shot and killed a
trespasser on his property when the trespasser approached the defendant with a raised
hand holding a lug wrench after the defendant, with a gun in his hand, warned the
trespasser not to move).
47. Under necessity, a person is permitted to commit a crime in order to avoid an
immediate harm to himself or to property that exceeds the harm associated with the
unlawful act, provided that the situation was caused by natural forces and that no rea
sonable alternative exists. See Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 977-79 (Alaska 1979) (con
victing defendant of reckless destruction of personal property, despite a necessity
defense, for unlawfully taking a dump truck and a front-end loader from a highway
equipment yard in order to free his truck which was stuck in a marshy area).
48. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 204, 208.
49. Id. at 259 n.224 (citing W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 48 (1972».
50. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text for the definition and purpose of
an alibi instruction.
51. Pattern jury instructions are standard jury instructions that a jurisdiction
adopts for its courts. See J. Clark Kelso, Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission
on Jury System Improvement, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1511-12 (1996). Such instructions
are typically drafted by judges, state bar associations, law schools, and trial and defense
lawyers associations. See id. at 1511. Pattern jury instructions are mandatory in some
jurisdictions and optional in others. See id. at 1511-12.
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crime was committed, you must find the defendant not guilty.52

This Note explores the issue of whether the Due Process Clause
requires a trial court to issue an alibi instruction to the jury when
requested to do so by the defendant.
II.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER ALIBI INSTRUCTIONS
ARE REQUIRED BY DUE PROCESS

The United States courts of appeals have divergent positions
on the issue of whether an alibi instruction is constitutionally re
quired. Three distinct views are represented by four federal
circuits.
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Hicks ,53 was the first
federal circuit to consider the issue and held that failure to give an
alibi instruction is a per se constitutional error subject to harmless
error review.54 Subsequent to Hicks, the Sixth Circuit in Presley v.
Rees,55 decided that a trial court's due process obligation to give the
jury an alibi instruction is not unconditional and depends on factors
such as the overall instructions to the jury and on the evidence in
troduced during the tria1. 56 The Presley opinion did not mention
the Fourth Circuit's position in Hicks.
More recently, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Simon,57
held that a trial court is not constitutionally required to give an alibi
instruction, even though the Third Circuit has a "supervisory" rule
unconditionally requiring an alibi instruction. 58 This Note does not
discuss Simon in the text, nor does it analyze the position of the
Third Circuit on the constitutional question, because the Simon
opinion does not provide any support for its theory and does not
address the contrary views of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits that pre
ceded it.59
52. Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit, Instruction
No. 6.01 (1995).
53. 748 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1984).
54. See id. at 857-58.
55. No. 85-5569, 1985 WL 14152 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 1985).
56. See id. at *1-2.
57. 995 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1993).
58. See id. at 1244-45. However, the Simon opinion does not explain what it
means by a "supervisory" rule.
59. The defendant, in Simon, was convicted in federal district court of first-degree
murder and possession of a dangerous weapon. See id. at 1242. At trial, the defendant
presented an alibi defense through the testimony of five witnesses. See id. at 1240. The
government, joined by the defendant's counsel, requested that the court give an alibi
instruction to the jury, but the court refused. See id. at 1241. On appeal, the United
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Most recently, the Ninth Circuit, in Duckett v. Godinez ,60
stated a position similar to that of Presley. Duckett held that a trial
court is required to give an alibi instruction if warranted by the to
tality of instructions given to the jury and the evidence offered at
tria1. 61
This Part describes the positions of the Fourth and Ninth Cir
cuits in the Hicks and Duckett cases, respectively. The Sixth Circuit
case of Presley is not discussed in the text because Duckett provides
a much more comprehensive analysis of the same theory.62
A.

The "Per Se Constitutional Error" Approach of the
Fourth Circuit

In United States v. Hicks ,63 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that an alibi instruction is constitutionStates Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held this failure to be an error under the
Third Circuit's "supervisory" rule but not under the United States Constitution. See id.
at 1244. The court reasoned that the rule requiring an explicit jury instruction on the
defendant's alibi defense was established in United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719, 723 (3d
Cir. 1971), and United States v. Barrasso, 267 F.2d 908, 910-11 (3d Cir. 1959), and that
"[t]he rule set forth in Booz and Barrasso is stated in supervisory terms. Indeed,
neither opinion holds that the prescribed alibi instruction is constitutionally mandated."
Simon, 995 F.2d at 1244.
The Simon court did not, however, close the door entirely on the possibility that an
alibi instruction may be constitutionally required. The court noted that "[a]lthough we
regard the district court's error as non-constitutional in nature, we recognize that the
improper alibi instruction also may be construed as 'constitutional' error, to the extent
that it suggests that the accused bears a burden of persuasion on the alibi defense." Id.
(citations omitted). Judge Scirica, who was on the Simon court but did not write the
opinion, considered the district court's failure to issue the alibi instruction to be a con
stitutional violation, but concluded that the error was harmless in light of the facts of
the case. See id. at 1244 n.13.
60. 67 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995).
61. See id. at 745.
62. The Presley case is unpublished and is available only electronically. See No.
85-5569, 1985 WL 14152 (6th Cir. Dec. 5, 1985). In Presley, the defendant, William
Presley, was convicted of first-degree rape in a Kentucky state court. See id. at *1.
Presley filed a petition of habeas corpus with the federal district court, which was de
nied. See id. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re
jected the defendant's contention that he was denied due process by the trial court's
refusal to give his requested alibi instruction to the jury even though Presley presented
seven witnesses in support of his alibi. See id. The Sixth Circuit found that under the
"totality of the circumstances," Presley did not receive an unfair trial, because the court
instructed the jury that it must find the defendant not guilty unless it determines, be
yond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant forced the victim to have sexual inter
course with him. See id. The court also placed importance on laboratory tests and the
victim's identification of Presley as part of the total circumstances that supported a
finding that Presley was not denied due process. See id.
63. 748 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1984).
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ally required if any evidence supporting an alibi is offered. 64 The
defendant, Benjamin Hicks, was convicted in federal district court
of armed bank robbery.65 Hicks did not testify at trial and did not
call any witnesses to present an alibi defense. 66 Nevertheless, the
government offered evidence that when Hicks was arrested for the
robbery, he stated that he was at his girlfriend's apartment between
11:15 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on the day of the robbery which had oc
curred just before noon. 67 Based on this evidence offered by the
government, Hicks requested the district court to give the jury an
instruction on his alibi, but the trial court refused. 68
Hicks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. The appellate court asserted that a defendant is en
titled to a jury instruction on any theory of defense having eviden
tiary support, regardless of whether the defendant or the
government offered the evidence. 69 The court stated the following:
Once it appeared that there was sufficient alibi evidence to per
mit the factfinder to pass on the issue, Hicks had a Sixth Amend
ment and due process right to have that issue submitted to a jury:
If the trial judge evaluates or screens the evidence supporting a
proposed defense, and upon such evaluation declines to charge
on that defense, he dilutes the defendant's jury trial by removing
the issue from the jury's consideration. In effect, the trial judge
directs a verdict on that issue against the defendant. This is im
permissible. . . . Failing to give the jury an alibi instruction was
thus an error of constitutional magnitude, and under Chapman v.
California, we can sustain Hicks' conviction only if we can say
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.1°

After deciding that Hicks' due process right was violated, the
Hicks court listed events that would render such error harmless,
including failure to request the instruction, overWhelming evidence
of the defendant's guilt, and negligible evidentiary support for the
alibi.71 The Hicks court concluded that the error was not harmless,
since none of the listed events had occurred and it could not be
ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's failure
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
1976».

See id. at 857-58.
See id. at 856.
See id. at 856-57.
See id. at 856.
See id. at 857.
See id.
Id. at 857-58 (citations omitted).
See id. at 858 (citing United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 1151, 1153 (2d Cir.
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to give the alibi instruction did not contribute to the conviction,72
B.

The "Conditional Constitutional Error" Approach of the
Ninth Circuit

Duckett v. Godinez 73 was decided after Hicks. The Duckett
opinion cited Hicks only for the fact that the Fourth Circuit is the
sole circuit to hold that failure by a trial court to give an alibi in
struction is a constitutional error,74
In Duckett, Tony Duckett was convicted in Nevada state court
of burglary and the murder of his uncle and aunt.75 At trial, Duck
ett testified that he was with his brother and two friends when the
murders occurred,76 Duckett requested that the trial court instruct
the jury on his alibi defense, but the court refused to do SO.77 After
the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed Duckett's conviction,78
Duckett filed a habeas corpus petition in the United Stated District
Court for the District of Nevada, which was denied,79 Duckett ap
pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on grounds that the
trial court's refusal to give his requested alibi instruction violated
his due process and fair trial rights. 8o
The Duckett court concluded that Duckett's due process rights
were not violated because the overall jury instructions included
Duckett's alibi defense by way of inference from the reasonable
doubt instruction. 81 In deciding against Duckett, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that a defendant has a right to an instruction on the
defendant's theory of defense,82 but stated that" 'it is not reversible
error to reject a defendant's proposed instruction on his theory of
72. See id. at 858.
73. 67 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995).
74. See id. at 745.
75. See id. at 738.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 743. The following instruction was proffered, but not used:
The defendant has introduced evidence for the purpose of showing that he was
not present at the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense for
which he is here on trial. If, after a consideration of all the evidence, you have
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the time the crime was
committed, he is entitled to an acquittal.
Duckett v. Nevada, 752 P.2d 752, 753 (Nev. 1988), affd in part sub nom. Duckett v.
Godinez, 67 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995).
78. See Duckett, 752 P.2d at 754.
79. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 738-39.
80. See id. at 743.
81. See id. at 745.
82. See id. at 743 (citing United States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Escobar de Bright, 742 F.2d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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the case if other instructions, in their entirety, adequately cover that
defense theory.' "83 According to the Duckett court, whether a state
court's failure to give an alibi instruction violates due process de
pends on the "totality" of instructions given to the jury and the evi
dence introduced at trial84 because "constitutionality [is]
determined not by focusing on ailing instruction 'in artificial isola
tion' but by considering effect of instruction 'in the context of the
overall charge.' "85
The trial court instructed the jury that the state is required to
prove every material element of the charged offense beyond a rea
sonable doubt. 86 From this reasonable doubt instruction, the Duck
ett court reasoned that the jury was impliedly told that "the state
bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt Duckett's
presence at the scene of the crime [and b]ecause the state bore this
burden, Duckett clearly did not bear the burden of proving his ab
sence from the scene."87 Additionally, the court noted that Duck
ett's evidentiary support for his alibi evidence was weak. 88 Based
on the overall instructions, which included the reasonable doubt in
struction, and the weakness of Duckett's alibi evidence, the court
concluded that the omission of the alibi instruction did not violate
Duckett's due process rights. 89 Thus, Duckett held that the deter
mination of whether due process is violated by a court's refusal to
give an alibi instruction depends on the totality of instructions given
to the jury, as well as the evidence offered at tria1. 90
The Duckett court, while holding that an alibi instruction is not
necessarily required by due process, indicated that an alibi instruc
tion requested by the defendant is required for cases within the
Ninth Circuit. 91 The Duckett court cited United States v. Zuniga 92
and several other Ninth Circuit cases93 in support of this require
ment. In drawing upon the Zuniga opinion, the Duckett court
83. Id. at 743 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434,
1438 (9th Cir. 1990».
84. See id. at 745,(citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).
85. Id. (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 746.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 745-46.
91. See id. at 743.
92. 6 F.3d 569, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1993).
93. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 743-44 (citing United States v. Hairston, 64 F.3d 491,
494 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hoke, 610 F.2d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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stated that in the Ninth Circuit, "when a specific alibi instruction is
requested, it must be given"94 and "that instructions on the pre
sumption of innocence, the government's burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the identifica
tion of the defendant as the perpetrator of the charged crime are
not adequate substitutes for a specific alibi instruction."95 Accord
ing to Duckett, the Ninth Circuit requires the alibi instruction "be
cause, without it, there is a danger that the jury may interpret the
defendant's failure to prove his alibi as proof of guilt."96 The Duck
ett court explained that the Ninth Circuit requires the alibi instruc
tion, pursuant to its role of reviewing cases on direct appeal, to
compel a trial court to follow sound judicial practice even though
such practice is not required by the Constitution. 97
The Duckett court distinguished cases on direct appeal from
the federal district court with those state court convictions reviewed
on habeas petitions with regard to constitutional requirements. The
court stated the following:
The fact that a jury instruction is inadequate by Ninth Circuit
direct appeal standards does not mean a petitioner who relies on
such an inadequacy will be entitled to habeas relief from a state
court conviction. In habeas proceedings challenging state court
convictions, relief is available only for constitutional violations.
We have never held ... that failure to give a specific alibi instruc
tion is necessarily a constitutional violation.98

Thus, the positions of the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
are diametrically opposed as to whether an alibi instruction is con
stitutionally required. The Fourth Circuit imposes an unconditional
requirement on a trial court to give the instruction, while the Ninth
Circuit conditions the necessity of giving the instruction on the re
sult of a test involving the totality of instructions given to the jury
and the evidence introduced at trial.
III.

SUPPORT FOR THE "PER SE ERROR", ApPROACH

The legal analysis in this Part supports the position that a trial
court's failure to give the jury an alibi instruction, when the defend
94.
95.
1993)).
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 743 (citing Hairston, 64 F.3d at 494; Ragghianti, 560 F.2d at 1379).
Id. at 743-44 (citing United States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569, 570-71 (9th Cir.
Id. at 744 (citing Zuniga, 6 F.3d at 570).
See id.
Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991)).
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ant provides the requisite evidentiary support for the alibi, is a per
se constitutional error subject to harmless error review. Part lILA
argues that a trial court's failure to give the jury an alibi instruction
unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proving the alibi to the de
fendant and is a per se due process error. Parts III.B and lILC add
support to the "per se error" theory by analogizing alibi instructions
to reasonable doubt instructions and to a related class of burden
shifting instructions. Part lILD contends that, under the "per se
error" approach, the per se constitutional error of not giving the
jury an alibi instruction is subject to harmless error review.
A.

Shift of Burden for Proof of Alibi

This section supports a "per se error" theory by demonstrating
that a trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defendant's
alibi unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof for the alibi to the
defendant. The analysis establishes the preceding proposition by
parsing it into two components and supporting each component in
dependently. First, the analysis argues, on the basis of the related
cases of Stump v. Bennett99 and Johnson v. Bennett,lOO that it is a
due process error for a trial court to shift the burden of proof of an
alibi to a defendant. Second, the analysis shows that cases decided
by United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits hold that failure of a trial court to give the
jury an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proving the alibi to the
defendant.
In Stump, the defendant's conviction of murder in an Iowa trial
was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court,101 At trial, the defendant
testified that he was driving on a highway while the crime was com
mitted, and offered witnesses in support of this alibi defense. 102 In
a habeas corpus petition to the federal district court, the defendant
claimed that the trial court violated his due process rights by in
structing the jury that the defendant has the burden of proving his
alibi by a preponderance of the evidence.103 After the district court
denied the petition, the defendant appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which held that the de
fendant was deprived of due process by the instruction,lo4 The
99. 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968).
100. 393 U.S. 253 (1968).
101. See Stump, 398 F.2d at 113.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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Eighth Circuit considered the instruction to be unconstitutional be
cause it "shift[ ed] the burden of persuasion on an essential element
of the crime and thus require[d] the defendant to assume the onus
of proving a negative averment, i.e., non-presence."105 The effect of
the instruction, according to the Stump court, was to negate the
government's requirement to prove the defendant's presence at the
crime scene. 106
The United States Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Bennett,107
considered the same issue as Stump with similar facts. In Johnson,
the defendant was convicted of murder in an Iowa trial and
presented witnesses during the trial to support his contention that
he was 165 miles away from the crime scene at the time the murder
occurred.lOS The Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court rejection
of a habeas corpus petition in which the defendant argued that the
Iowa trial court violated his due process right under the Fourteenth
Amendment by instructing the jury that the defendant is required
to prove his alibi defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 109
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this case to con
sider the constitutionality of the jury instruction.n o Rather than ex
plicitly comment on the issue, the Supreme Court vacated the
Eighth Circuit judgment in Johnson, because of the subsequent
Eighth Circuit holding in Stump v. Bennett1ll that the jury instruc
tion is constitutionally prohibited. The Supreme Court stated the
following:
105. Id. at 120.
106. See id.
107. 393 u.s. 253 (1968).
108. See id. at 253.
.
109. See id. at 254 (citing Johnson v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967)). The
Iowa state trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The burden is upon the defendant to prove [the] defense [of alibi] by a pre
ponderance of the evidence, that is, by the greater weight or superior evi
dence. The defense of alibi to be entitled to be considered as established must
show that at the very time of the commission of the crime the accused was at
another place so far away, or under such circumstances that he could not with
ordinary exertion have reached the place where the crime was committed so as
to have committed the same. If by a preponderance of the evidence the de
fendant has so shown, the defense must be considered established and the
defendant would be entitled to an acquittal. But if the proof of alibi has failed
so to slIow, you will not consider it established or proved. The evidence upon
that point is to be considered by the jury, and if upon the whole case including
the evidence of an alibi, there is a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, you
should acquit him.
Id. at 254 n.l.
110. See id. at 254.
111. 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968).
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In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner argued, among other
points, that the State had denied him due process of law by plac
ing on him the burden of proving the alibi defense. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa rejected
this argument and denied the petition. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari
to consider the constitutionality of the alibi instruction, along
with other issues. After we granted certiorari the Court of Ap
peals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en bane, held in another case
that the Iowa rule shifting to the defendant the burden of proving
an alibi defense violates the Due Process Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment. Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (1968). In
view of that holding, we vacate the decision in this case and re
mand to that court for reconsideration. 112

On the same day that it vacated Johnson, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in Stump.1 13 On remand, the Eighth Circuit re
considered Johnson and reversed the defendant's conviction on
grounds that the instruction was constitutionally prohibited inas
much as the factual distinctions between Johnson and Stump had
no legal significance.u 4 Thus, the United States Supreme Court in
Johnson impliedly approved of the holding in Stump that it is a vio
lation of the Due Process Clause to shift the burden of proof for an
alibi to a defendant. Federal and state courts concur with this inter
pretation of the Supreme Court's action in Johnson v. Bennett. 115
112. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 254-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing
Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968».
113. See Bassett v. Smith, 464 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1972), for the statement that
the Supreme Court vacated Johnson and denied certiorari in Stump on the same day,
namely December 16, 1968.
114. See Johnson v. Bennett, 414 F.2d 50, 55-56 (8th Cir. 1969).
115. Federal courts have cited Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S. 253 (1968), for the
proposition that it is a due process violation to shift the burden of proof for an alibi to
the defendant. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131 n.39 (1982); United States v.
Robinson, 602 F.2d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1979); Bassett v. Smith, 464 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir.
1972). State courts are in accord with this interpretation. See Grace v. State, 200 S.E.2d
248,257 (Ga. 1973) (discussing the violation of due process by shifting the burden of
proof of an element of a crime and stating that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has not
had occasion to speak to this question, it is notable that the court vacated and re
manded Johnson v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967); for further consideration in
light of Stump v. Bennett"); Thornton v. State, 178 S.E.2d 193, 195 (Ga. 1970) (Felton,
J., dissenting) ("I am of the opinion that the action taken by the Supreme Court of the
United States remanding the case of Johnson v. Bennett ... to the 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals, was a direction to reverse the case under the circumstances."); Common
wealth v. French, 259 N.E.2d 195, 232 (Mass. 1970) ("The Iowa rule discussed in the
Stump case was construed in Johnson v. Bennett, as 'shifting to the defendant the bur
den of proving an alibi defense.'" (citations omitted».
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Admittedly, there is a distinction between overtly shifting the
burden of proof for an alibi by giving an explicitly erroneous in
struction, as in Stump and Johnson, and refusing to give an alibi
instruction altogether. Nevertheless, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits as
sert that a court's failure to give an alibi instruction impermissibly
shifts the burden of proving the alibi to the defendant. 116 Inasmuch
as jurors are not legally trained, there is the danger that the jury will
interpret the defendant's assertion of an alibi defense, coupled with
the defendant's inability to persuade the jury that the alibi is true,
as proof of the defendant's guilt.1 17 Arguably, a reasonable doubt
instruction informs the jury that the prosecution must prove each
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. lls A
reasonable doubt instruction, however, does not expressly inform
the jury that the defendant is not obligated to prove his contention
that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed. While a rea
sonable doubt instruction may imply that the defendant is not re
sponsible for proving his alibi, jurors may not understand this
implication. 119 Empirical studies lend support to the proposition
116. See United States v. Zuniga, 6 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Hicks, 748 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Booz, 451 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Megna, 450 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1971). In Zuniga, Hicks, Burse, and Megna, the courts of appeals each
reversed a defendant's conviction because the trial court refused to give the jury an alibi
instruction, thereby failing to alert the jury that the prosecution has the burden of proof
as to the alibi and effectively shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. See Zuniga,
6 F.3d at 570, 572; Hicks, 748 F.2d at 857-58; Burse 531 F.2d at 1153; Megna, 450 F.2d at
513. In Booz, the defendant's conviction was reversed because the trial court refused to
give the alibi instruction requested by the defendant and instead gave the jury an am
biguous alibi instruction followed by one that was overbroad, thereby confusing the jury
as to the burden of proof for the alibi. See Booz, 451 F.2d at 723.
117. See Zuniga, 6 F.3d at 570 ("An alibi instruction is critical because a juror,
unschooled in the law's intricacies, may interpret a failure to prove the alibi defense as
proof of the defendant's guilt."); Burse, 531 F.2d at 1153 ("In those cases where an alibi
defense is presented, there exists the danger that the failure to prove that defense will
be taken by the jury as a sign of the defendant's guilt.").
118. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consti
tutional requirement of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt for each element of an
alleged crime and of giving the jury an instruction on the reasonable doubt standard.
119. The Ninth Circuit, in Zuniga, stated the following:
[A]n instruction ... must be given so as to acquaint the jury with the law that
the government's burden of proof covers the defense of alibi, as well as all
other phases of the case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the alibi
never shifts to the accused who offers it, and if the jury's consideration of the
alibi testimony leaves in the jury's mind a reasonable doubt as to the presence
of the accused, then the government has not proved the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt.
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that jurors may have difficulty in understanding the implications of
the reasonable doubt instruction. 120 Furthermore, the Third Circuit
views a reasonable doubt instruction, together with an instruction
informing the jury that the burden of proof never shifts to the de
fendant, to still be insufficient in the absence of a clearly stated alibi
instruction, because the jury may be confused as to the burden of
proof.121 At least one court has held that a trial court's refusal to
charge on an alibi defense causes the most extreme possible shift of
burden by "'removing the issue from the jury's consideration ...
[and] . . . direct[ing] a verdict on that issue against the defend
ant.' "122 Thus, an alibi instruction is necessary because it leaves no
doubt as to the government's burden of proof for the alibi.
In contrast with the preceding arguments, the Seventh Circuit
held that an alibi instruction is redundant and unnecessary if the
Zuniga, 6 F.3d at 570 (quoting United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th
Cir. 1977». The Second Circuit, in Burse, also considered the effect of omitting an alibi
instruction on the burden of proof when the reasonable doubt instruction was given:
In those cases where an alibi defense is presented, there exists the danger that
the failure to prove that defense will be taken by the jury as a sign of the
defendant's guilt. ... Even when the jury has been instructed as to the govern
ment's burden, there remains the danger that the effect of the attempted alibi
defense will be misunderstood. Only a specific instruction can insure that this
problem will not occur.
Burse, 531 F.2d at 1153.
120. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of empirical
studies which conclude that jurors have difficulty in understanding their instructions,
generally, and the reasonable doubt instruction in particular.
121. In Booz, the court instructed the jury as to the government's burden to
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that this burden never shifts
to the defendant. See Booz, 451 F.2d at 722. In refusing to give the defendant's re
quested alibi instruction, the trial judge gave a confusing alibi instruction which he at
tempted to offset with the following supplementary instruction:
It isn't up to [the defendant] to prove anything. It is up to the government to
prove its case. The defense may, if they wish, which they attempted to do in
this case, but it isn't required by the law. The law requires that the Govern
ment convince you beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 723. The court of appeals, however, considered both instructions to be
inadequate:
The insufficiency of the charge of the trial court is not cured by the more
general language in the charge that the burden of proof never shifts from the
government. . .. A defendant is entitled to specific instructions on the burden
of proof on alibi issues because the jury is likely to become confused about the
burden of proof when an appellant offers this type of evidence. When affirma
tive proof, best known by the defendant himself, is offered, a likelihood exists
that jurors would look to that proof for persuasion of its truth.
Id.
122. United States v. Hicks, 748 F.2d 854, 858 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting United
States v. Strauss, 376 F.2d 416, 419 (5th CiT. 1967».
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court instructs the jury that the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was at the scene of the
crime. 123 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Duckett, held that the rea
sonable doubt instruction eliminated the need for a specific alibi
instruction.124 Nevertheless, it is the special need to direct the
jury's attention to the prosecution's burden of disproving the alibi
that undercuts the argument in Duckett that a reasonable doubt in
struction adequately instructs the jury on the defendant's alibi the
ory.125 While it is true that proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime logically cancels the defendant's
alibi, there is no guarantee that the jury will not expect the defend
ant to prove the alibi as part of its overall consideration of whether
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 126 Since a rea
sonable doubt instruction does not directly address the defendant's
alibi defense, jurors must infer from the reasonable doubt instruc
tion that the defendant is not obligated to disprove his alibi. On the
basis of empirical studies, however, there is a likelihood that aver
age jurors will not successfully engage in this reasoning process. 127
Thus, an explicit alibi instruction is needed for assurance that the
jury will understand the correct legal standard as to the burden of
proof for the alibi.
There is empirical support for the positions of the Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits that an alibi instruction is
required because jurors may not understand that the reasonable
doubt instruction impliedly includes an instruction as to the burden
of proof for the alibi. 128 Studies undermine any assumption that
123. See Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 926 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Since the jury was
informed that [defendant's] presence was necessary for conviction, nothing would have
been added by instructing that his absence would require acquittal. Because such an
instruction would have been redundant, we find no error in its omission.").
124. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for the assertion in Duckett that
the reasonable doubt instruction enables the jury to infer that the defendant is not
required to prove his alibi.
125. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for the basis of this special
need.
126. See supra note 117 for a discussion of why jurors may consider a defendant's
inability to support his alibi to be proof of guilt.
127. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of empirical
studies which conclude that jurors have difficulty in understanding their instructions,
generally, and the reasonable doubt instruction in particular.
128. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for the view of the Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits that, notwithstanding the reasonable doubt in
struction, failure to give the jury an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant.
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juries adequately understand their instructions. 129 The results of
three different studies show that jurors find it difficult to under
stand standard jury instructions.D° In another study, in Michigan,
involving over 500 subjects and the participation of social scientists,
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, the subjects exhibited a
low level of comprehension of jury instructions with especially poor
performance on comprehension of the reasonable doubt instruc
tion. l3l It makes sense, therefore, to instruct jurors in the most di
rect and simple way possible.D 2 Accordingly, it is more probable
that the jury will comprehend the prosecution's burden to disprove
the defendant's alibi if an explicit alibi instruction is given than if
the jury must obtain this understanding indirectly by inference from
the reasonable doubt instruction.
Thus, the positions on "shift of burden" of the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, combined with the Eighth Circuit
holding in Stump v. Bennett 133 and Supreme Court action in John
son v. Bennett,134 adequately support a "per se error" theory.
Under a "per se error" approach, a court's failure to instruct the
See Peter Meijes TIersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22
L. REv. 37, 41-42 (1993). "Much research by linguists, psychologists and
others has confirmed that jurors tend to have great difficulty understanding the instruc
tions that are supposed to guide their decisionmaking." Id. at 42.
130. See id. at 42-44.
131. See Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Crimi
nal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Pro
ject, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 405, 412-16, 429 (1990). For each of the following
true/false statements, less than 35% of the participants gave correct answers after being
instructed on reasonable doubt:
A REASONABLE DOUBT MUST BE BASED ONLY ON THE EVI
DENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED IN THE COURTROOM, NOT ON
ANY CONCLUSION THAT YOU DRAW FROM THE EVIDENCE.
129.

HOFSTRA

. . . YOU HAVE A REASONABLE DOUBT IF YOU CAN SEE ANY
POSSIBILITY, NO MATTER HOW SLIGHT, THAT THE DEFENDANT
IS INNOCENT. IF SO, YOU SHOULD FIND THE DEFENDANT NOT
GUILTY .
. . . TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASON
ABLE DOUBT, YOU MUST BE 100% CERTAIN OF THE DEFEND
ANT'S GUILT.
Id. at 414.
132. See TIersma, supra note 129, at 73 ("The most obvious way to ensure that
jurors understand the law that guides their task is to continue efforts to write instruc
tions that an average juror can understand.").
133. 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968).
134. 393 U.S. 253 (1968).
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jury on the defendant's alibi serves to unconstitutionally shift the
burden of proof of the alibi to the defendant in violation of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

B. Analogy to Reasonable Doubt Instructions
Whether a trial court's failure to give the jury an alibi instruc
tion is a per se constitutional error or a conditional constitutional
error can also be assessed by analogy to other jury instructions for
which this determination has already been made by the United
States Supreme Court. This section analogizes the alibi instruction
to the reasonable doubt instruction and argues, on the basis of the
analogy, that a trial court's failure to give the jury an alibi instruc
tion is a per se constitutional error. The next section analogizes the
alibi instruction to a related class of burden-shifting instructions135
and also contends, on the basis of the analogy, that a trial court's
failure to give the jury an alibi instruction is a per se constitutional
error. In this manner, these sections add to the support developed
in Part III.A for the "per se error" theory. In contrast, Part IV
analogizes alibi instructions to presumption of innocence instruc
tions in support of a "conditional error" theory.136
In In re Winship,137 the Supreme Court held that "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti
tute the crime with which he is charged."138 This constitutional pro
tection reflects the fact that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt
dates at least from our early years as a Nation"139 and protects
135. The burden-shifting instructions are those described in Sandstrom v. Mon
tana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The Sandstrom errors associated with these instructions are
related to the due process reasonable doubt requirements stated in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970). See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580 (1986).
136. The analogy between alibi instructions and presumption of innocence in
structions supports the view that a "conditional error" test governs whether a court's
failure to give an alibi instruction is a constitutional error.
137. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
138. Id. at 364. In Winship, the New York Family Court found a 12-year old boy
to have stolen $112 from a woman's pocketbook, based on proof by a preponderance of
the evidence standard as dictated by § 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act. See
id. at 359-60. The defendant's appeal, based on a claim that his due process rights were
violated by the Family Court's use of the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof, was denied by both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and
the New York Court of Appeals. See id. at 360. In reversing the conviction, the United
States Supreme Court held that the reasonable doubt standard of proof is a per se
requirement of due process that applies to juveniles as well as to adults. See id. at 365,
368.
139. Id. at 361.
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against" 'dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures
of life, liberty and property."'140 The Supreme Court has inter
preted the Winship holding as requiring proof for each element of
the alleged crime.1 41 Additionally, the Supreme Court considers
failure by a trial court to give the jury a reasonable doubt instruc
tion, as to the required standard of proof for the charged offense, to
be a per se violation of due process that can never be harmless
error.1 42
The application of Winship to the alibi instruction is straight
forward. The reasonable doubt instruction informs the jury that the
government must prove each element of the charged offense be
yond a reasonable doubt and the alibi instruction informs the jury
that the government is required to disprove the alibi beyond a rea
sonable doubt. 143 Since an alibi defense directly negates the actus
reus, or conduct, element of the crime,144 and since it is a per se
constitutional error if the trial court does not instruct the jury as to
the burden of proof for the elements of the alleged crime,145 it is
reasonable to consider that it is a per se constitutional error if the
trial court fails to give the alibi instruction as to the burden of proof
for the alibi. Although the reasonable doubt instruction logically
includes the effect of the alibi, by requiring the government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was at the
scene of the crime, this extension of Winship is needed in order to
focus the jury's attention on the government's burden of proof
when the defendant introduces evidence concerning his wherea
bouts at the time the crime was committed. 146 If the jury is not
140. [d. at 362 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895)).
141. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1,5 (1994). In Victor, the issue was whether
the trial court's instruction defining "reasonable doubt" violated the Constitution. See
id. The Victor opinion preceded its discussion of this issue with the statement that
"[t]he government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged
offense." [d. (interpreting Winship).
142. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979) (citing Cool v. United
States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972)).
143. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text for the definition and purpose of
an alibi instruction.
144. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the proposition that the alibi
serves to negate the actus reus element of an offense.
145. See supra note 141 and accompanying text for the requirement, under the
Constitution, that the prosecution must prove each element of a charged offense be
yond a reasonable doubt. See supra note 142 and accompanying text for the trial
court's duty, under the Constitution, to give the jury a reasonable doubt instruction.
146. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the special
need to give the alibi instruction even if the trial court instructs the jury that the prose
cution must prove the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
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directly informed that the prosecution has the burden of proof for
the alibi, the jury may think that the defendant is required to prove
that the alibi is true.1 47 In recognition of this danger, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits require explicit alibi instructions in their respective
circuits. 148 Empirical studies, which demonstrate that juries have
difficulty in understanding court instructions generally and the rea
sonable doubt instruction in particular, add support to the idea that
an alibi instruction should be required. 149 An explicit alibi instruc
tion will effectively communicate to the jury that the prosecution,
and not the defendant, has the burden of proof for the alibi. In
contrast, a reasonable doubt instruction without an accompanying
alibi instruction may nbt be successful in communicating this con
cept to the jury, since this mode of communication is indirect and
requires that the jurors use a logical reasoning process to infer who
has the burden of proof for the alibi.
In summary, failure by a trial court to give the jury an alibi
instruction is analogous to a court's failure to give a reasonable
doubt instruction, which violates due process. Therefore, failure by
a court to give the jury an alibi instruction is a per se due process
error.

C.

Analogy to Sandstrom Burden-Shifting Instructions

Failure to give the alibi instruction can also be analogized to a
class of constitutionally flawed instructions, enumerated in Sand
strom v. Montana,150 that erroneously shift the burden of proof for
the mens rea element of the charged offense to the defendant. In
Sandstrom, the defendant was convicted of "deliberate homicide,"
which required proof that he purposely or knowingly killed the vic
tim.151 At trial, the court overruled the defendant's objection to the
instruction that" '[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordi
nary consequences of his voluntary acts.' "152 On appeal, the de
147. See supra note 117-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
jury may view the defendant as having the burden to prove his alibi.
148. See supra notes 116-22 for a discussion of the consistent positions of the
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits that a trial court must give the jury an
alibi instruction, since failure to do so impermissibly shifts the burden of proof for the
alibi to the defendant.
149. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of empirical
studies relating to the ability of jurors to understand their instructions.
150. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
151. See id. at 512-13.
152. Id. at 513 (quoting jury instruction).
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fendant contended that the instruction erroneously shifted the
burden of proof to him on the element of intent, in violation of the
Due Process Clause.1 53 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Mon
tana affirmed the conviction on grounds that the instruction merely
required the defendant to present some evidence that he did not
intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts and, there
fore, the instruction did not violate the Due Process Clause. 154 Af
ter granting certiorari to decide the constitutionality of the
instruction, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the de
fendant and reversed the conviction. 155
In holding that the erroneous instruction was a per se constitu
tional error, the Supreme Court explained that the presumption I56
in the instruction, that a person intends the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary acts, could be interpreted by the jury in four possi
ble ways: as a permissive inference, mandatory presumption, con
clusive presumption, or a burden-shifting inference. 157 According
to the Supreme Court, a permissive inference permits the jury to
infer the defendant's intent from the defendant's conduct,158 while
a mandatory presumption requires the jury to infer the requisite
intent from the defendant's conduct unless the defendant offers
contrary evidence. 159 The government argued that permissive in
ferences and mandatory presumptions are not constitutional viola
tions because they are rebuttable with only "some" evidence as
needed to satisfy a burden of production rather than a burden of
persuasion. l60 The Supreme Court did not evaluate this constitu
153. See id.
154. See id. at 513-14.
155. See id. at 514.
156. "'A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made
from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action or
proceeding.''' Id. at 515 nA (quoting MONT. R. EVID. 301(a». Presume is "'to suppose
to be true without proof.''' Id. at 517 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTION
ARY 911 (1974».
157. See id. at 514-15, 517.
158. See id. at 514.
159. See id. at 515.
160. See id. The burden of persuasion is the burden required to prove a claim to
the jury. See HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE CRIMlNAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTIONS §lA (1993). The burden of production, also known as the burden
of going forward, is the burden of providing some evidence to support a claim. See id.
§§ lA, 1.7. The burden of production as applied to the defendant may be inconsequen
tial in a criminal trial, however, since if the prosecution does not meet its burden, a
directed verdict for the defendant results. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516 n.5. In con
trast, if the defendant does not meet a burden of production, nothing happens since a
court may not direct a verdict against a criminal defendant. See id. at 516 n.5.
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tional argument, however, since the Supreme Court noted that the
instruction at issue could have reasonably been interpreted more
severely as a conclusive presumption or a burden-shifting infer
ence. 161 Under either interpretation, the instruction would be un
constitutional since it would relieve the prosecution of the burden
of proving the element of.intent beyond a reasonable doubt.1 62
In defining a conclusive presumption to be "an irrebuttable di
rection by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts trig
gering the presumption,"163 the Supreme Court reasoned that a
conclusive presumption would require the jury in Sandstrom to find
that the defendant had the requisite intent upon determining that
the defendant caused the death of the victim.1 64 The Supreme
Court concluded that this would effectively direct the jury to find
against the defendant as to intent, which would eliminate the re
quirement, under Winship, that the prosecution prove the element
of intent beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby depriving the defend
ant of due process. 165
The Supreme Court stated that a burden-shifting inference re
quires the jury "to find intent upon proof of the defendant's volun
tary actions (and their 'ordinary' consequences), unless the
defendant provers] the contrary by some quantum of proof which
may well [be] considerably greater than 'some' evidence-thus ef
fectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of in
tent."166 Thus, the Supreme Court found, under Winship, that a
burden-shifting inference violates due process because it removes
the government's burden of proving the defendant's intent beyond
a reasonable doubt. 167
Sandstrom is a natural extension of the holding in Winship in
connection with the government's obligation to prove each fact that
constitutes the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 168
Under Winship, the prosecution is required by the Due Process
See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515-17.
See id. at 521.
Id. at 517.
164. See id. at 523.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 517.
167. See id. at 520-21.
168. The United States Supreme Court agrees with this interpretation of Sand
strom. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 580 (1986) ("Sandstrom was a logical extension
of the Court's holding in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that the prosecution must
prove 'every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
charged' beyond a reasonable doubt.").
161.
162.
163.
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Clause to prove each element of an alleged crime beyond a reason
able doubt. 169 Under Sandstrom, an instruction containing a pre
sumption that undermines this burden of proof violates the
Constitution. 170
Failure to give an alibi instruction is analogous to a burden
shifting inference contained within a Sandstrom instruction and un
dermines the prosection's beyond a reasonable doubt burden of
proof. While a Sandstrom instruction shifts the burden of proof as
to the mens rea element regarding the defendant's intent,171 failure
to give an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proof as to the actus
reus element regarding the defendant's whereabouts. 172 The bur
den of proof is shifted to the defendant when the alibi instruction is
not given, because of the possibility that the jury will hold the de
fendant responsible for proving the truth of the alibi. 173 The United
States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits each agree with this view, and therefore require an
alibi instruction. 174 Empirical studies lend credibility to this argu
ment, because they demonstrate a high probability that a jury will
not interpret a jury instruction correctly.175
Admittedly, the burden-shifting mechanism in a Sandstrom in
struction is within the text of the instruction itself, while failure to
give an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proof indirectly by not
focusing the jury's attention on the prosecution's burden of proof
for the alibi. In other words, a Sandstrom instruction leads the jury
m a wrong direction, while not giving an alibi instruction fails to
169. See supra note 141 and accompanying text for support of the constitutional
requirement that the prosecution must prove each element of an alleged crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.
;
170. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text for the Supreme Court's
holding in Sandstrom that both a conclusive presumption and a burden-shifting infer
ence unconstitutionally relieve the prosecution of proving the element of intent.
171. See supra note 166 and accompanying text for language in the Sandstrom
opinion which asserts that a burden-shifting inference shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant on the element of intent.
172. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of how fail
ure to give an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proof of the defendant's wherea
bouts to the defendant.
173. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the
jury may view the defendant as having the burden to prove his alibi.
174. See supra notes 116-22 for a discussion of the consistent positions of the
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits that a trial court must give the jury an
alibi instruction, since failure to do so impermissibly shifts the burden of proof for the
alibi to the defendant.
175. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of empirical
studies relating to ability of jurors to understand their instructions.
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point the jury in the right direction. This distinction is constitution
ally insignificant, however, since in either case the jury is not ade
quately informed as to the required burden of proof for an element
of an offense. Since a burden-shifting Sandstrom instruction is a
per se due process error, shifting the burden of proof to the defend
ant for the mens rea element, it is reasonable to consider a court's
failure to give an alibi instruction as a per se due process error,
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant for the actus reus
element.
In summary, failure by a trial court to give the jury an alibi
instruction is analogous to the giving of a Sandstrom burden-shift
ing instruction which violates due process. Therefore, failure by a
court to give the jury an alibi instruction is a per se due pf(~cess
error.
D.

Is a Harmless Error Test Required?
If a trial court's failure to give the jury an alibi instruction is a

per se constitutional error, then the question arises as to whether
the error is subject to a test of harmlessness. Constitutional harm
less error analysis originated from the conclusion in Chapman v.
California I76 that some constitutional errors are not severe enough
to require automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction. 177
Chapman fashioned the rule that a constitutional error is harmless
if the government proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error
did not contribute to the conviction,178 The Chapman court gave
examples of constitutional violations not susceptible to harmless er
ror review, including denial of counsel at trial, a jury instruction
containing an unconstitutional presumption, and a judge having a
176. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
177. See id. at 22.
178. See id. at 24. Until 1993, the Chapman harmless error rule was applied to
the direct review of state and federal convictions as well as to the collateral review of
habeas corpus cases. See Leslie R. Stem, Case Comment, Constitutional Law-Less
Onerous Harmless Error Standard Applies on Habeas Corpus Review-Brecht v. Abra
hamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 172, 177 (1994). In Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), however, the Supreme Court established a different
harmless error standard for habeas corpus cases on petition from state criminal convic
tions, namely the test of whether the error "'had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Id. at 622 (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946». Thus, it became more difficult, under Brecht, for a
federal court to reverse a criminal conviction based on habeas corpus petition from a
state conviction than, under Chapman, to reverse a criminal conviction on direct appeal
from a state or federal court.
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financial interest in the outcome of the trial. 179 Prior to Chapman,
harmless error analysis applied only to non-constitutional errors,
since any constitutional error required the reversal of a
conviction. 180
This section demonstrates, by a two-step argument, that a per
se constitutional error due to a trial court's failure to give an alibi
instruction is subject to a harmless error test. First, failure to give
an alibi instruction is a burden-shifting error.1 81 Second, a burden
shifting error requires a test of harmlessness, which follows from
Stump v. Bennett,182 as well as from Sandstrom v. Montana 183 and
Rose v. Clark. 184
Stump held that an instruction to the jury that the defendant
must prove his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence unconstitu
tionally shifts the burden of persuasion for the alibi to the defend
ant. 185 In addition to declaring the flawed instruction to be a
constitutional error, the Stump court performed a Chapman harm
less error analysis to decide that the error was not harmless. 186
Thus, the erroneous burden-shifting alibi instruction in Stump re
quired a harmless error test.
Sandstrom held that an instruction to the jury that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts unconstitu
tionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on the element
of intent.1 87 The Sandstrom opinion declined to decide, however,
whether such error could ever be harmless. 188 In considering the
same issue, the Supreme Court was equally divided in Connecticut
179. See Chapman, 386 u.s. at 43-44 (Stewart, J., concurring).
180. See Stem, supra note 178, at 176.
181. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of how fail
ure to give an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proof of the alibi to the defendant.
182. 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968). See supra Part III.A for a discussion of Stump,
which held that an instruction to the jury, that a defendant has the burden of proving
his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence, shifts the burden of proof for the alibi to
the defendant in violation of the Due Process Clause.
183. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). See supra Part III.C for a discussion of Sandstrom,
which held that an instruction to the jury, that a defendant charged with deliberate
homicide is legally presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts,
shifts the burden of proof on the element of intent to the defendant in violation of the
Due Process Clause.
184. 478 U.S. 570 (1986). See infra notes 191-201 for a discussion of Rose, which
held that a Sandstrom error is subject to harmless error review.
185. See Stump, 398 F.2d at 113, 116, 120.
186. See id. at 121-23.
187. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 512, 521.
188. See id. at 526-27.
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v. Johnson,189 on the question of whether a Sandstrom error is sub
ject to a test of harmless error.1 90 Rose v. Clark 191 finally resolved
the issue by finding burden-shifting Sandstrom errors to be subject
to Chapman harmless error analysis. 192 In Rose, the defendant was
accused of second-degree murder, which required proof of malice
under Tennessee law. 193 The trial court instructed the jury that
"'[a]ll homicides are presumed to be malicious in the absence of
evidence which would rebut the implied presumption [and] ... if
the State has proven beyond a reasonable ... doubt that a killing
has occurred, then it is presumed that the killing was done mali
ciously.' "194 The trial court found the defendant guilty of second
degree murder and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals af
firmed.1 95 On habeas corpus review, the federal district court held
that the instruction, which created the presumption of malice, was a
Sandstrom error that violated due process by shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant on the element of malice. 196 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but con
cluded that the error was not harmless because the defendant had
contested the issue of malice during the trial.1 97 After granting cer
tiorari on the harmless error issue, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to
determine whether the error was harrnless.1 98 The Supreme Court
reasoned that "an instruction that impermissibly shift[s] the burden
of proof on malice ... is not 'so basic to a fair trial' that it can never
be harmless"199 since there may nevertheless be sufficient evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each element of the
charged offense has been satisfied. 20o In cases of Sandstrom errors,
the Court viewed the inquiry to be "'whether the evidence was so
dispositive of intent that a reviewing court can say beyond a reason
189. 460 U.s. 73 (1983).
190. See id. at 90 (Burger, J., dissenting). See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 572 n.1
(1986) for a discussion of the divergent opinions in Connecticut v. Johnson on whether a
Sandstrom instruction could be harmless.
191. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
192. See id. at 579-80.
193. See id. at 574.
194. Id. (quoting a portion of the jury instructions).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 574-75.
197. See id. at 575.
198. See id. at 584.
199. Id. at 580 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1967)).
200. See id.
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able doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on
the presumption.' "201
Since failure to give an alibi instruction is an unconstitutional
burden-shifting error, the preceding discussion of Stump and Rose
supports the view that the error is subject to a test of harmlessness.
Thus, the "per se error" approach requires application of a harm
less error test to the per se constitutional error of failing to give the
jury an alibi instruction.
IV.

SUPPORT FOR THE "CONDITIONAL ERROR" ApPROACH BY
ANALOGY TO PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

The legal analysis in this Part supports the position that a trial
court's failure to give the jury an alibi instruction is a conditional
constitutional error. This Part reviews Supreme Court decisions on
whether a presumption of innocence instruction is constitutionally
required, and relates the results of this analysis, by analogy, to the
issue of whether an alibi instruction is constitutionally required.
Part IV.A provides an introduction to the presumption of inno
cence. Part IV.B describes the principal presumption of innocence
cases, namely Taylor v. Kentucky 202 and Kentucky v. Whorton,z03
that develop a "conditional error" theory based on a "totality of
circumstances" test for determining whether a trial court's refusal
to give a presumption of innocence instruction to the jury violates a
defendant's due process rights. This section also reviews recent
opinions of the United States Supreme Court and United States
Courts of Appeals which contain divergent views on whether the
"totality of circumstances" test still applies. This analysis neverthe
less concludes that the "totality of circumstances" test is the prevail
ing test for whether a court's refusal to give a presumption of
innocence instruction violates a defendant's due process rights.
Part IV.C provides support for the analogy between alibi in
structions and presumption of innocence instructions, but notes
meaningful distinctions between the two types of instructions. This
section also argues that the "totality of circumstances" test used in
the principal case of Kentucky v. Whorton 204 for constitutionality
for presumption of innocence instructions is the appropriate "con
201. Id. at 583 (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 97 n.5 (1983) (Pow
ell, J., dissenting)).
202. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
203. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
204. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
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ditional error" test for constitutionality for alibi instructions. Part
IV.D contends that the determination of constitutional error by a
"totality of circumstances" test under a "conditional error" ap
proach is not subject to a test of harmlessness.
A.

Introduction to Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence requires the jury to view a de
fendant as innocent until proven guilty.205 Thus, the jury must de
cide the guilt or innocence of the defendant only from the evidence
introduced at trial and not from "official suspicion, indictment, con
tinued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at
trial. "206
The presumption of innocence is fundamental to American
criminal justice. In 1895, the Supreme Court stated the following:
" 'The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
ciiminallaw.' "207 The presumption of innocence is a fair trial right
under the Due Process Clause208 that is expressed through the rea
sonable doubt standard of proof.209

205. See id. at 790 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
206. Taylor, 436 U.S. at 485. The following presumption of innocence instruction
illustrates how this doctrine is to be understood.
The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime. Thus a defendant,
although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate"-with no evidence
against him. And the law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before
the jury to be considered in support of any charge against the accused. So the
presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless the
jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.
E. DEVITT & c. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 11.14 (3d
ed.1977).
207. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (quoting Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
208. See id. ("The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in
the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal jus
tice." (citations omitted)).
209. "The [reasonable doubt) standard provides concrete substance for the pre
sumption of innocence," thereby providing a mechanism through which the presump
tion of innocence functions. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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Development of Case Law for Presumption of Innocence
Instructions
1.

Principal United States Supreme Court Cases

The United States Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Kentucky,2l0
held that the defendant's due process rights were violated by the
trial court's failure to give the jury a presumption of innocence in
struction. 211 In stressing that a defendant has a right to be judged
by the jury only from the evidence introduced at trial,212 the
Supreme Court noted three significant instances in which the jury
heard facts not introduced in evidence that necessitated an instruc
tion to alert the jury to decide the defendant's innocence or guilt
only on the evidence. 213 Although the trial court instructed the jury
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt,is required for conviction, the
Supreme Court emphasized that a reasonable doubt instruction
does not alert the jury to the need for judging the defendant solely
on admitted evidence, and certainly did not compensate for lack of
210. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
211. See id. at 490. The defendant was convicted in a Kentucky state court for
robbery. See id. at 479-81. At trial, the court instructed the jury that the government
has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but denied
the defendant's request for an instruction on the presumption of innocence. See id. at
480-81. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction and the
Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to grant further review. See id. at 482-83. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the defendant was denied
due process by the trial court's refusal to give a presumption of innocence instruction.
See id. at 490.
212. See id. at 485-86.
213. First, the prosecutor stated in his closing argument that the defendant, "'like
every other defendant who's ever been tried who's in the penitentiary or in the reforma
tory today, has this presumption of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.'" Id. at 486 (quoting prosecutor's closing argument). The Taylor Court consid
ered this statement to have "linked petitioner to every defendant who turned out to be
gUilty and was sentenced to imprisonment. It could be viewed as an invitation to the
jury to consider petitioner's status as a defendant as evidence tending to prove his
guilt." Id. at 486-87.
Second, the prosecutor stated that '''[o]ne of the first things defendants do after
they rip someone off, they get rid of the evidence as fast and as quickly as they can.'"
Id. at 487 (quoting prosecutor's closing argument). According to the Taylor Court, this
statement "implied that all defendants are guilty and invited the jury to consider that
proposition in determining petitioner's guilt or innocence." Id.
Third, the prosecutor stated in his opening statement that the victim of the robbery
took out a warrant against the defendant and that the grand jury indicted the defend
ant. See id. Then the prosecutor read the indictment to the jury. See id. From this, the
Taylor Court reasoned that "the jury not only was invited to consider the petitioner's
status as a defendant, but also was permitted to draw inferences of guilt from the fact of
arrest and indictment." Id.
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a presumption of innocence instruction in the circumstances of
Taylor.2 14
One year later, in Kentucky v. Whorton,215 the Supreme Court
construed the Taylor holding to be limited to the facts of the Taylor
case, and held that it is a conditional requirement, not an absolute
requirement, of the Due Process Clause for a court to give the jury
a presumption of innocence instruction. 216 The Supreme Court in
Whorton established the rule that failure by a trial court to give the
jury a presumption of innocence instruction violates the Constitu
tion if, in light of the "totality of the circumstances," the defendant
did not receive a fair trial.2 17 According to Whorton, the totality of
the circumstances include the totality of instructions to the jury, the
evidence offered, the prosecutor's remarks to the jury, and other
relevant factors. 21s
214. See id. at 488.
215. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
216. See id. at 789. The defendant was found guilty of robbery by a Kentucky
trial court. See id. at 788. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the conviction for
failure of the trial court to give the defendant's requested presumption of innocence
instruction. See id. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in reliance on the United States
Supreme Court holding in Taylor, assumed that a trial court's failure to give a presump
tion of innocence instruction to the jury is a per se violation of a defendant's constitu
tional due process rights. See id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court did not correctly interpret Taylor. See
id. The United States Supreme Court explained that the Taylor holding was limited to
the facts of Taylor, which included weak evidence against the defendant and the prose
cutor's remark to the jury that "'tended to establish [the defendant's] guilt [and] cre
ated a genuine danger that the jury would convict petitioner on the basis of those
extraneous considerations, rather than on the evidence introduced at triaL'" Id. at 789
(quoting Taylor, 436 U.S. at 487-88).
The United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the Kentucky Supreme
Court to apply a "totality of the circumstances" test, see infra note 217, to determine
whether the trial court's failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction deprived
the defendant of his constitutional due process right. See Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789-90.
On remand, the Kentucky Supreme Court, applying the "totality of circumstances" test,
held that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence
did not violate Whorton's due process right to a fair trial. See Whorton v. Kentucky,
585 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Ky. 1979).
217. The Supreme Court, in Whorton, came to the following conclusion:
[T]he failure to give a requested instruction on the presumption of innocence
does not in and of itself violate the Constitution. Under Taylor, such a failure
must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances-including all
the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel, whether the weight of
the evidence was overwhelming, and other relevant factors-to determine
whether the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial.
Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789.
218. See supra note 217 for a statement of the "totality of circumstances" test
announced by the Whorton Court. The Duckett test for determining whether failure to
give an alibi instruction violates due process is nearly as comprehensive as the Whorton
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Recent United States Supreme Court Cases

In the years immediately following Whorton, federal courts of
appeals applied the "totality of circumstances" test to cases in
which the trial court failed to give a presumption of innocence in
struction to the jury.219 In the last decade, however, the United
States Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals have stated dif
fering and inconsistent views of what the law is when a trial court
refuses to give the jury a presumption of innocence instruction.
In 1991, in Arizona v. Fulminante,22o the United States
Supreme Court listed a multitude of constitutional errors, including
a court's failure to instruct the jury on presumption of innocence,
that are not reversible per se, but are subject to harmless error
analysis.
Since this Court's landmark decision in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967), in which we adopted the general rule that a
constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a
conviction, the Court has applied harmless-error analysis to a
wide range of errors and has recognized that most constitutional
errors can be harmless. See, e.g., ... Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of
.
) ....221
mnocence

From this clear pronouncement in Fulminante, it might appear that
Fulminante transformed the Whorton holding from a "conditional
error" approach, based on a "totality of circumstances" test, to a
"per se error" approach that includes a test for harmlessness. Nev
test. The two tests both include the totality of instructions and the evidence introduced
at trial. However, the prosecutor's remarks to the jury are included in the Whorton test
but not in the Duckett test. See supra text accompanying note 90 for a statement of the
Duckett test.
219. See United States v. Hollister, 746 F.2d 420, 424 (8th CiT. 1984) (stating that
a presumption of innocence instruction was not required because "the weight of the
evidence against [the defendant] was strong" and "the prosecutor did not attempt to
make improper arguments to the jury"); United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 274-75
(5th Cir. 1982) (holding that "we are unwilling to believe that the jury retired to deliber
ate less than fully aware of the presumption of innocence," since the trial court in
structed the jury on presumption of innocence at the onset of the trial and referred to
these instructions at the close of the trial; in addition, the defense counsel explained
presumption of innocence to the jury during his closing argument); United States v.
Dejohn, 638 F.2d 1048, 1057-58 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that the purpose of a presump
tion of innocence instruction was served by the reasonable doubt instruction given to
the jury and that the introduction of "similar bad acts" evidence was offered by the
prosecution for a proper purpose and did not constitute extrinsic evidence heard by the
jury).
220. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
221. Id. at 306-07.
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ertheless, this reinterpretation of Whorton is dictum and does not
formally overrule Whorton.
Two years after Fulminante, the United States Supreme Court,
in Delo v. Lashley,222 reiterated, in dictum, the original Whorton
holding that "the defendant is not entitled automatically to an in
struction that he is presumed innocent of the charged offense"223
and that "[a]n instruction is constitutionally required only when, in
light of the totality of the circumstances, there is a 'genuine danger'
that the jury will convict based on something other than the State's
lawful evidence . . . ."224
Since Fulminante and Lashley each expressed views in dictum
regarding the appropriate legal theory for determining whether a
trial court's failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction is
a due process error, Fulminante does not overrule Whorton, and
Lashley does not affirm Whorton. Admittedly, the Supreme Court
in Fulminante categorized a trial court's failure to give the jury a
presumption of innocence instruction as a per se constitutional er
ror subject to harmless error review. 225 In spite of Fulminante,
however, and notwithstanding recent federal appellate cases that
support the view stated in Fulminante ,226 the prevailing rule is that
222. 507 U.S. 272 (1993).
223. Id. at 278 (citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979».
224. Id. (citing and quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 (1978».
225. See supra note 221 and accompanying text for the pertinent language in
Fulminante.
226. There have been inconsistent interpretations of the Whorton holding by the
Ninth Circuit regarding the constitutional implication of failure by a trial court to give a
presumption of innocence instruction. In United States v. Boyland, No. 93-10324, 1994
WL 43168 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit restated the Whorton "totality of circumstances" standard. See id. at *2 (citing
Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979». In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Thornton, Nos. 93-10660, 93-10669, and 93-10737,1994 WL 475860 (9th
Cir. Sept. 1, 1994), viewed Kentucky v. Whorton as having applied "harmless error anal
ysis ... to [a] trial court's failure to give [a] requested 'presumption of innocence' jury
instruction." Id. at *1 (citing Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789).
The conflicting views within the Ninth Circuit as reflected in Thornton and Boy
land, with respect to which theory applies to the analysis of whether a presumption of
innocence instruction is constitutionally required, is possibly due to the fact that Thorn
ton was decided later in 1994 than was Boyland and may reflect a change in views in the
Ninth Circuit. Thornton was decided on September 1,1994, while Boyland was decided
on February 14, 1994. See supra preceding paragraph. Nevertheless, Thornton did not
cite Boyland. Alternatively, these conflicting views may represent an intra-circuit split
inasmuch as different panels of judges heard Boyland and Thornton. The judges on the
Boyland panel were Schroeder, Canby, and Wiggins. See Boyland, 1994 WL 43168.
The judges on the Thornton panel were Norris, Thompson, and Trott. See Thornton,
1994 WL 475860. Only one of these six judges (Thompson) was on the panel of
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failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction is subject to a
"conditional error" test for constitutionality.
C.

Implication for Alibi Instructions
1.

The Analogy

The presumption of the defendant's innocence and the defend
ant's alibi defense have analogous constitutional roles in a criminal
trial. There are four factors in support of the analogy. First, the
presumption of innocence and the defendant's alibi theory of de
fense are both constitutional rights which directly stem from the
right to a fair triaP27 under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 228
Second, both the presumption of innocence and an alibi de
fense are related in similar ways to the reasonable doubt burden of
proof. A defendant's presumed innocence is sufficient to acquit the
defendant until a jury is otherwise convinced by the prosecution's
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.229
Similarly, a defendant's alibi defense is sufficient to acquit the de
fendant until a jury is otherwise convinced by the prosecution's
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was at the
scene of the crime when the crime occurred and was not where the
defendant claimed to be.230
Third, both a presumption of innocence instruction and an alibi
instruction direct the jury's attention to jury responsibilities that are
not obvious from a reasonable doubt instruction. A presumption of
Brunetti, Thompson, and Hawkins, that decided Duckett. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67
F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1995).
To add to the confusion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has cited Fulminante for the list of constitutional errors, including a trial court's failure
to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence, that are subject to harmless error
analysis. See Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1137 (4th CiT. 1996); United States v.
Johnson, 71 F.3d 139, 147 (4th CiT. 1995) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
227. The presumption of innocence is a fair trial right under the Due Process
Clause. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. A criminal defendant has a fair
trial right to present a complete defense. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 22 for support of the right to a fair trial under the Due Pro
cess Clause.
229. "[E]very person is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reason
able doubt ...." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,518 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230. An alibi is a complete defense which, if established, is conclusive evidence of
the defendant's innocence. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The prosecution
has the burden of disproving the alibi. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
The weight of the prosecution's burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra
note 141 and accompanying text.
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innocence instruction makes the jury aware of its duty to assess
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt solely on facts admitted into evi
dence and not on extrinsic facts that come to the jury's attention. 231
Similarly, an alibi instruction makes the jury aware of its duty to
assess the alibi in terms of the prosecution's burden to disprove it
beyond a reasonable doubt and not on the defendant's burden to
prove it. 232
Fourth, both a presumption of innocence instruction and an al
ibi instruction respond to factors in a trial which are extrinsic to the
instruction. A presumption of innocence instruction counteracts
the effect of non-evidentiary facts presented to the jury.233 Simi
larly, an alibi instruction negates any inclination that the jury might
have to require the defendant to prove the truth of the alibi that the
defendant offers as a defense. 234 Both of these instructions differ
from a Sandstrom instruction, which is intrinsically defective.235
Nevertheless, the analogy is not perfect and there are pertinent
distinctions between the presumption of innocence and the defend
ant's alibi defense. The presumption of innocence relates to the
jury's frame of mind regarding the defendant's innocence without
regard to the specific elements of the charged offense. 236 An alibi
defense, on the other hand, pertains to a specific element of the
offense, namely the actus reus element, relating to the whereabouts
of the defendant when the crime was committed. 237 Since the alibi
defense is linked with an element of the offense, failure to give the
alibi instruction directly impacts the burden of proof for the ele
ment, which in turn can be devastating to a defendant who is rely
ing primarily on the alibi to support his innocence.238 Failure to
231. See supra note 206 for the text of a presumption of innocence instruction
which directs the jury to acquit the defendant in the absence of sufficient evidence of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasomible doubt.
232. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for the proposition that the
prosecution has the burden of disproving the defendant's alibi.
233. See supra note 206 for a presumption of innocence instruction which bars
the jury from utilizing non-evidentiary facts in its determination of guilt or innocence.
234. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text for support for the proposition
that the prosecution has the burden of disproving the defendant's alibi.
235. A Sandstrom instruction is constitutionally flawed because of the text within
the instruction itself. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of Sandstrom instructions
and why they violate due process.
236. See supra note 205 and accompanying text for a statement of how the jury
must view the defendant's innocence.
237. See supra note 2 for a definition of an alibi defense.
238. An alibi negates the actus reus element of an alleged offense. See supra note
21 and accompanying text.

ALIBI INSTRUCTIONS & DUE PROCESS

1998]

381

give the presumption of innocence instruction, on the other hand,
does not negatively impact the defendant in as singular a manner as
does failure to give an alibi instruction. 239 Therefore, failure to give
the presumption of innocence instruction lacks the particularized
effect on the case that failure to give an alibi instruction may have.
In addition, the presumption of innocence relates to non-eviden
tiary facts that the jury may hear, but must not consider even if the
evidence of either the prosecution or the defendant validates those
facts.24o In contrast, the defendant's alibi is admissible evidence of
the defendant's whereabouts, which the jury must consider. 241
The preceding arguments suggest that presumption of inno
cence instructions and alibi instructions have analogous constitu
tional roles in a criminal trial despite some distinctions between
these instructions. Based upon this analogy, presumption of inno
cence instructions and alibi instructions should follow the same rule
as to whether a trial court's failure to instruct the jury is a constitu
tional error.
2.

The Conditional Error Test

To the extent that alibi instructions are analogous to presump
tion of innocence instructions, failure by a trial court to give the
jury an alibi instruction is a due process error that should be subject
to a test that is consistent with the Whorton rule. 242 The appropri
ate constitutional error test for failure to give an alibi instruction is
the "totality of circumstances" test of Whorton, rather than the
more focused test of Duckett. This is because the Whorton test con
siders all circumstances of the trial that could result in an unfair
trial when the instruction is not given, whereas the Duckett test con
siders most, but not all, of the pertinent circumstances that impact
the defendant's right to a fair trial.243 Both tests include factors of
the totality of instructions to the jury and the weight of the evidence
against the defendant. 244 The additional factor in the Whorton test
239. See supra note 206 for an example of a presumption of innocence
instruction.
240. See supra note 206 and accompanying text for the requirement that the jury
must consider only evidence admitted at trial in its determination of guilt or innocence.
241. See supra note 2 for a definition of an alibi.
242. See supra note 217 for a declaration of the Whorton rule.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 218 and 90 for the circumstances that
characterize the Whorton test and Duckett test, respectively.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 218 and 90 for the circumstances that
characterize the Whorton test and Duckett test, respectively.
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of the prosecutor's remarks to the jury245 should also apply to the
alibi instruction test. For example, if a prosecutor told the jury that
all defendants who commit crimes fabricate alibis, the resultant
prejudice would seem to undermine the alibi defense to the same
extent as the prosecutor's remark that "defendants . .. after they rip
someone off ... get rid of the evidence as fast ... as they can"
undermined the presumption of innocence in Taylor. 246 Accord
ingly, the appropriate test under this line of analysis is that failure
by a court to give a requested alibi instruction is a due process con
stitutional error if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the
defendant did not receive a fair trial. The circumstances include the
totality of instructions to the jury, the evidence introduced at trial,
the prosecutor's remarks to the jury, and all other relevant factors.
D.

Is a Harmless Error Test Required?
If a trial court's failure to give the jury an alibi instruction is a

constitutional error based on the results of a "totality of circum
stances" test, then a harmless error test is not required. This posi
tion is consistent with Taylor, in which the defendant's conviction
was reversed, without a harmless error analysis, by application of a
"totality of circumstances" test to the trial court's failure to give the
jury a presumption of innocence instruction. 247
The proposition that a harmless error inquiry is not needed
with the "conditional error" approach is supported by the relation
ship between the "conditional error" test and the harmless error
test. With the "conditional error" test, the defendant has the bur
den of proving that he was deprived of a fair trial, or equivalently,
that the verdict was affected by the court's failure to give the alibi
245. See supra text accompanying note 218 for the circumstances that character
ize the Whorton test.
246. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 (1978).
247. The Whorton opinion, which never discussed the issue of harmless error,
stated that the "totality of circumstances" test is derived from the Taylor court holding
that, based on the facts of the Taylor case, the Taylor trial court violated the defend
ant's due process rights by refusing to give a presumption of innocence instruction. See
Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789. Yet, the Taylor Court reversed the defendant's conviction on
grounds of constitutional error without inquiring as to whether such error was harmless.
This implies that Whonon viewed the "totality of circumstances" test as requiring re
versal without the need for a Chapman harmless error inquiry when the test determines
that a court's failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction is a due process
error. Extending this concept by analogy, there is no need for a harmless error test
when a "totality of circumstances" test determines that failure to give an alibi instruc
tion is a constitutional error. See supra Part IV.C.l for arguments in support of the
analogy between alibi instructions and presumption of innocence instructions.
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instruction. 248 With the harmless error test, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict was unaffected by
the court's failure to give the alibi instruction. 249 Consequently, if
the defendant establishes that failure to give the instruction de
prived him of a fair trial, then the error could not have been harm
less since the prosecution will necessarily be unable to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict.
In other words, the outcome of the harmless error test is linked to
the "conditional error" test for constitutionality in a way that makes
a harmless error test redundant and unnecessary.·

v.

WEIGHING THE "PER SE ERROR" AND "CONDITIONAL
ERROR" ApPROACHES

The Whorton hoiding2SO supports the use of a "conditional er
ror" approach based on a "totality of circumstances" test because of
an analogy between alibi instructions and presumption of innocence
instructions. 2s1 The analogy is not perfect, however, since the alibi
focuses directly on an element of the charged offense which the
prosecution must prove, while the presumption of innocence relates
to the general frame of mind of the jury regarding the defendant's
presumed innocence. 2s2 In addition, an alibi is admissible evidence
248. Under a "conditional error" theory, the test for constitutional error deter
mines, in light of the totality of the circumstances, whether the defendant received a fair
tria!. See supra Part IV.C.2 for the recommended formulation of this test for alibi in
structions. This is equivalent to a test of whether the verdict would have been affected
had the alibi instruction been given. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
In Strickland, a convicted defendant in a capital punishment case alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel during the sentencing hearing, in violation of the Sixth Amend
ment. See id. at 671. The Supreme Court held that the contested conduct by the de
fendant's counsel is subject to a conditional error test which "requires the defendant to
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional [con
duct], the result of the proceeding would have been different," id. at 694, or equiva
lently, "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair tria!."
Id. at 687. The court viewed the capital sentencing hearing as indistinguishable from an
ordinary tria!. See id. Thus, under Strickland, if a defendant alleges on appeal that a
constitutional error occurred during the trial, where the alleged error is subject to a
"conditional error" test for constitutionality, then the defendant has the burden of dem
onstrating a reasonable probability that a constitutional error occurred.
249. The test for harmless error requires the prosecution to prove beyond a rea
sonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction. See supra text accom
panying note 178.
250. See supra note 217 for the Whorton Court's formulation of the "totality of
circumstances" test for determining whether a trial court's failure to give the jury a
presumption of innocence instruction is a constitutional error.
251. See supra Part IV.C.1 for arguments in support of the analogy.
252. See supra Part IV.C.1 for a discussion of this distinction.
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which the jury must consider, whereas the presumption of inno
cence relates to non-evidentiary facts which the jury must
disregard. 253
On the other hand, the "per se error" approach makes sense in
view of three strong arguments. First, a trial court's failure to give
an alibi instruction unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to
the defendant. 254 Second, the alibi instruction is analogous to the
reasonable doubt instruction and failure to give a reasonable doubt
instruction is a per se due process error. 255 Third, alibi instructions
are analogous to Sandstrom burden-shifting instructions. 256 While
a Sandstrom instruction unconstitutionally shifts the burden of
proof as to the mens rea element regarding the defendant's in
tent,257 failure to give an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proof
as to the actus reus element regarding the defendant's wherea
bouts. 258 Nevertheless, the analogy between alibi instructions and
Sandstrom instructions is not perfect, since an alibi instruction re
lates to the prosecution's burden of proving facts which concern the
defendant's alibi259 and are extrinsic to the instruction, while a
Sandstrom instruction relates to a defect in the instruction itself.260
The preceding discussion reveals that both the "conditional er
ror" approach and the "per se error" approach have merit. On bal
ance, however, this Note favors the "per se error" approach which
is supported by three strong arguments that complement one an
other. The reality that a trial court's failure to give an alibi instruc
tion may unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the
defendant is especially troublesome in light of the deference which
the Constitution gives to a criminal defendant in matters relating to
253. See supra Part IV.C.1 for a discussion of this distinction.
254. See supra Part III.A for analysis in support of the contention that failure to
give an alibi instruction unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant.
255. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the analogy between an alibi instruc
tion and a reasonable doubt instruction.
256. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the analogy between an alibi instruc
tion and a Sandstrom burden-shifting instruction.
257. See supra note 166 and accompanying text for the holding in Sandstrom that
a burden-shifting inference shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on the element
of intent.
258. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of why failure
to give an alibi instruction shifts the burden of proof of the defendant's whereabouts to
the defendant.
259. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text for the definition and purpose of
an alibi instruction.
260. A Sandstrom instruction is constitutionally flawed because of the text within
the instruction itself. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of Sandstrom instructions
and why they violate due process.
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the burden of proof for elements of an alleged offense. 261 Thus, the
need to protect the reasonable doubt standard of proof required of
the prosecution for the defendant's alibi, which relates directly to
the actus reus element, seems compelling. 262 In contrast, the "con
ditional error" approach depends entirely on the analogy between
alibi instructions and presumption of innocence instructions. 263 A
relevant imperfection in the analogy is that failure to give an alibi
instruction may be devastating to a defendant who is relying pri
marily on the alibi to support his innocence, whereas failure to give
a presumption of innocence instruction is unlikely to have as partic
ularized an effect on the outcome of the trial,264 In addition, a
"conditional error" approach carries the risk that a trial judge may
incorrectly assess the totality of circumstances when deciding not to
give an alibi instruction and the defendant may not prevail on ap
peal because the defendant bears the burden of proving that the
trial judge erred. 265 This risk of denying the defendant a fair trial is
virtually non-existent with a "per se error" approach, since the trial
judge will be required to give the instruction unconditionally, and if
the judge fails to give the instruction, the prosecution will be re
quired to meet the stringent standards of the Chapman harmless
error test in order to avert a reversal of the conviction. 266 Accord
ingly, this Note concludes that a trial court's failure to give a re
quested alibi instruction, where there is evidentiary support for the
alibi, is a per se constitutional error subject to harmless error
reVIew.
CONCLUSION

This Note proposes that a trial court's failure to give a re
quested alibi instruction, where there is evidentiary support for the
261. See supra notes 137-41 for a discussion of the constitutional requirement
that the prosecution prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt for each element of an al
leged crime.
262. See supra text accompanying note 21 for the proposition that the alibi serves
to negate the actus reus element of an offense.
263. See supra Part IV for support of a "conditional error" approach based on
analogy between alibi instructions and presumption of innocence instructions.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 238-39 for a discussion of this distinction.
265. See supra note 248 for the proposition that if a defendant alleges on appeal
that a constitutional error occurred during the trial, where the alleged error is subject to
a "conditional error" test for constitutionality, then the defendant has the burden of
demonstrating a reasonable probability that a constitutional error occurred.
266. The test for harmless error requires the prosection to prove beyond a rea
sonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction. See supra note 178
and accompanying text.
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alibi, is a per se constitutional error subject to harmless error re
view. The error is harmless if the government proves beyond a rea
sonable doubt that failure to give the instruction did not contribute
to the conviction.
The prosecution must bear the burden of proof for the defend
ant's guilt for each element of the charged offense. Since an alibi
directly negates the actus reus element, this burden is not dimin
ished as to the defendant's alibi and may not be shifted to the de
fendant. Accordingly, a defendant who advances an alibi defense
with evidentiary support has an unconditional due process right to a
jury instruction as to the prosecution's burden of proof for the alibi.
Jack P. Friedman

